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I
am pleased to be here today to discuss an
extremely important topic. But I believe it
wise to begin on a humble note. The title of
this session includes the phrase “optimal central
bank law.” In designing a central bank law, we do
not have a well-specified mathematical model to
optimize, and consequently we cannot expect to
find the optimal law. It would be a mistake, I believe,
to be so bold as to recommend a legal framework
for all countries for all time. The fact is that most
high-income countries today, and many low- and
middle-income countries, have achieved a high
degree of success in maintaining low inflation, even
though laws in these countries display substantial
differences. We need to think rather abstractly
about the design of the legal framework for the
central bank and recognize that there are different
ways to achieve the same end. 
We should also recognize that success in achiev-
ing low and stable inflation, or price stability if you
prefer that formulation, is relatively recent. We may
well discover that some institutional arrangements
are more robust over time, as we observe how
various arrangements stand up to stresses not yet
observed.
An institution as important as a central bank
cannot take a particular form without substantial
public understanding of the reasons for that form.
A century ago, most informed people believed that
the only sound basis for a monetary system was for
paper money to be convertible into gold. For some
years after World War II, most observers believed
that fixed exchange rates were essential to monetary
stability. Clearly, popular opinion and understand-
ing of economic ideas imposes limits on our ability
to transform the economy by changing laws. 
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that the
views I express here are mine and do not necessarily
reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve
System. I thank my colleagues at the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis for their comments, but I retain
full responsibility for errors.
I’ll organize my thoughts in four sections. In
the first, very brief section, I’ll discuss economic
principles. I start there because the legal framework
within which a central bank operates must be con-
sistent with the way a market system works, and
the goals assigned to a central bank must be within
its power to achieve. Next, I’ll discuss central bank
law consistent with economic principles and, in a
separate section because of its importance, the
design of central bank independence. Finally, I’ll
address the issue of central bank transparency. 
To make the exposition a bit easier, I’ll refer to
the leadership of a central bank as the “governor,”
which will refer to the governor, chairman, or govern-
ing board as appropriate. I’ll refer to the top elected
official of the government as the “president,” which
will refer to the president or prime minister as
appropriate.
ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES
The logical place to begin an analysis of how to
design an optimal central bank law is with a simple
statement of economic principles. The principles I
believe should guide our thinking are these:
• Inflation, anticipated and especially unantici-
pated, above some threshold rate is costly.
Deflation is also costly. Costs are low when
the departure of the rate of price change,
whether above or below the threshold rate,
is small; costs are larger when the departure
is larger. The evidence suggests that the costs
of departures are not symmetric; deflation of
5 percent per year is likely to be much more
costly than inflation of 5 percent per year.
• There is no long-run tradeoff between infla-
tion and unemployment, and the short-run
tradeoff may well be too unreliable to be
useful for policymakers.
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 • Market expectations about future monetary
policy (and future economic policies gener-
ally) are extremely important in determining
how well monetary policy will work.
CENTRAL BANK LAW
Because inflation and deflation are costly, a
central bank ought to have an inflation target. I
believe that the appropriate target is zero inflation,
properly measured—that is, abstracting from mea-
surement errors in price indexes. Others believe that
a small, positive rate of inflation is appropriate. The
difference between 0 and, say, 2 percent inflation
per year is a minor matter relative to other issues.
In particular, reasonable stability in the rate of infla-
tion and especially in the expected rate of inflation
over the medium term are more important than
whether the target rate is 0 or 2 percent per year.
Whether the target is expressed as a point or a
range is an interesting issue, but not fundamental.
I personally favor a legislated inflation target,
but whether the target is legislated is not the main
issue. If the weight of public opinion is not behind
a legislated target, it will not be effective. The United
States does not have a legislated target, but since
the mid-1990s the Federal Reserve has been success-
ful in achieving and maintaining a low average rate
of inflation. What is needed is not so much a legis-
lated inflation target but a target framework that
the public regards as having constitutional force. In
the United States, the gold standard used to have
constitutional force even though it was never written
into the Constitution explicitly. 
What I mean by “constitutional force” is that a
law or practice cannot be changed without resort
to lengthy discussion and, in the case of a law, by a
super majority or its equivalent. A provision of
constitutional force is basic to the functioning of
society; it is part of the shared consensus, backed
by widespread consent, within which everyday
legislation is crafted. 
In the United States, repeal of First Amendment
protection of freedom of speech is unthinkable, and
that was essentially the situation applying to the
gold standard for many years. But when the gold
standard ceased to have constitutional force as a
consequence of the Great Depression, over time
Congress repealed legislation providing for gold
coins and other features of the gold standard. I think
it is true—I hope it is true—that in the United States
today the idea that Congress or the Federal Reserve
would deliberately aim for, or tolerate, a sustained
inflation rate of, say, 8 percent per year is now
unthinkable. If so, the idea that the Federal Reserve
has a responsibility to maintain low and stable
inflation in the neighborhood of recent experience
is approaching the level of constitutional force. 
I am sure, however, that in many countries
debate over a legislated inflation target has been
extremely valuable in helping to create a consensus
of constitutional force. What I am emphasizing is
that such legislation can never be the end of the
matter; central bankers and others must constantly
explain the reasons for a legislated target to ensure
that it is not simply absorbed into the immense
mass of legislation on the books of our democratic
countries that is widely ignored and largely forgotten.
Because the effectiveness of a central bank in
achieving sustained low inflation depends impor-
tantly on its credibility, there is no substitute for
consistent policies that build market confidence
over time. Once credibility is lost, regaining it takes
time and a willingness to endure short-run pain,
where the short run may be measured in years.
Maintaining credibility over time requires institu-
tional strength that transcends current leadership.
Absent crisis conditions, policy should evolve rela-
tively slowly over time, with each change studied
carefully and then explained fully. Otherwise, the
predictability upon which credibility depends may
be incomplete. The purpose of sustained low infla-
tion is to minimize price level shocks that upset
business planning and redistribute income and
wealth arbitrarily. For the same reason, the central
bank should strive to avoid surprises in its own
policy procedures.
One of the most difficult and hotly debated
issues is whether monetary policy should be con-
fined to an inflation objective or should also have
an employment or growth objective. My view is that
it does not make economic sense for the central bank
to have objectives stated in terms of the level of
employment or the rate of growth of real gross
domestic product (GDP). It is within the power of
the central bank to achieve a long-run inflation objec-
tive, but not to achieve an objective for the level of
employment or the unemployment rate. No organi-
zation should be assigned an objective that it cannot
achieve or, at best, achieve only temporarily.
I think it is within the power of the central bank,
however, to contribute to employment stability. If
inflation expectations are solidly held, which is an
expected outcome of achieving an inflation objective
on a sustained basis, then the central bank can
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Provided that the central bank’s short-run policy
decisions do not shake confidence in the long-run
policy, it can direct short-run policy to help cushion
employment fluctuations. It is reasonable to inter-
pret a number of episodes in the United States since
1982 in this way; most recently, I think that it is
undeniable that the Fed’s rapid reduction in its fed-
eral funds rate target in 2001 helped to soften the
extent of the recession. Of course, we cannot judge
the success of a policy by one incomplete episode—
the judgment of history might be that policy was
too easy too long, although that is certainly not my
judgment at this time. 
My point is not to offer commentary on recent
Federal Reserve policy but to emphasize that success
on the inflation front provides the opportunity to
employ monetary policy to stabilize, or to work in
the direction of stabilizing, short-run fluctuations
in real activity. And if I am correct that a central
bank that is successful on the inflation front has
the power to contribute to economic stability, then
I see no reason why a government should not assign
a central bank an objective of contributing to stabil-
ity of the real economy to the extent consistent with
the inflation objective. The Federal Reserve operates
under a vague legislated instruction—vague in the
sense that no numerical targets are specified—to
contribute to achieving high employment and price
stability. If the statutory language is interpreted as I
have suggested, then I think such objectives make
perfectly good sense. 
A legislated employment stabilization objective
complicates the relationship between the elected
government and the central bank because the central
bank must maintain a long horizon. That horizon
is typically considerably longer than the horizon of
elected officials who quite naturally and understand-
ably have an intense focus on the next election.
Because of the way the economy works, a central
bank must be willing to back away from efforts to
stabilize income and employment when such efforts
threaten the inflation objective. Failing to maintain
the primacy of the inflation objective only puts
economic stability at risk over the longer run. The
United States and many other countries had ample
experience with this scenario in the 1970s; excesses
in short-run recession fighting created higher infla-
tion over the longer run and deeper recessions
later on.
Central bank independence is the institutional
design that promises to reconcile the different
horizons of elected officials and the central bank.
This subject is so important that it deserves special
attention.
CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE
There is widespread agreement that central
bank independence leads to better monetary policy.
I’ve introduced the logic of independence by refer-
ring to different horizons of elected officials and
central banks, but I’m not sure that is the total story.
Elected officials do maintain some policies with
great continuity over time and make some invest-
ments with long payback periods. For two quite
different U.S. examples, consider the long horizon
behind decisions to invest in national parks and
military research. 
I note, however, that competition among those
seeking electoral office does not work well in the
context of central bank leadership. Democratic
leaders compete for office promising change and
improvement rather than continuity and stability,
whereas an incoming central bank governor will
almost certainly want to continue the policies of a
successful predecessor and will emphasize his
commitment to do so. In contrast, I don’t think I’ve
ever heard a candidate emphasize that he or she is
running for office to continue the policies of a suc-
cessful predecessor of a different political party.
Political independence and nonpartisan monetary
policy provide the promise of policy stability over
time, which in turn stabilizes expectations in asset
markets. Such stability and continuity is essential
to a successful monetary policy.
Central bank independence requires that the
governor have a substantial term of office and that
individual policy decisions not be subject to revision
by the government. However, such structural features
of the central bank institutional design are only the
starting point for central bank independence. If a
president publicly attacks the central bank’s policies,
then independence will certainly be incomplete.
This subject is a very difficult one for a democratic
society: How can an important area of public policy
be off limits for comment and criticism by elected
officials? Yet, such criticism clearly unsettles mar-
kets and damages the effectiveness of monetary
policy.
The only way around this problem, it seems to
me, is for the government to exercise great forbear-
ance and confine criticism to internal discussions
with the central bank. That has come to be the
practice in the United States, but it has not been
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 established long enough that it can be regarded as
institutionalized. Consideration of this issue makes
clear that optimal central bank design goes far
beyond legal issues per se; it is ludicrous to consider
the possibility of passing a law saying that the presi-
dent is not allowed to comment on central bank
policy! Clearly, though, if the president does not
retain confidence in the central bank, the country
is in substantial trouble. In this situation, the presi-
dent must be prepared to replace a failing central
bank leadership when terms expire. 
Central banking is a governmental function,
but I think that some observers most committed to
democratic principles overlook the possibility of
employing private-sector activity and principles for
governmental ends. A well-understood example is
the value of using pollution taxes rather than com-
mand-and-control regulations to achieve environ-
mental objectives. 
The organization of the Federal Reserve System
fits this perspective very nicely. Members of the
Board of Governors are appointed by the President
of the United States and confirmed by the Senate.
However, presidents of the Reserve Banks are
appointed by the directors of the Reserve Banks,
subject to approval by the Board of Governors.
Directors of Reserve Banks have powers and respon-
sibilities that are closer to those of a private company
than of those of a government agency. At each
Reserve Bank, six of the nine directors are elected
by the commercial banks that are members of the
Reserve Bank; the other three directors are appointed
by the Board of Governors on the recommendation
of the Reserve Bank. The directors are explicitly non-
political; they are drawn from the local community
and are not permitted to hold partisan political
office or participate in political activity through
such activities as heading campaign committees or
leading political fund-raising efforts. The directors,
in turn, select the Bank president and first vice
president, subject to approval by the Board of
Governors.
This institutional arrangement clearly involves
ultimate control of the Federal Reserve System
through the political process centered on the Board
of Governors. Yet, a considerable part of the System’s
leadership obtains office through what is essentially
a private-sector process. My own case illustrates
the point nicely. I was a university professor in
Rhode Island, with no personal or institutional
connection to the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
If the appointment of the Bank president were con-
trolled by a political process involving, say, the
state governors of the states with territory in the
Eighth Federal Reserve District (Missouri, Arkansas,
Mississippi, Tennessee, Kentucky, Indiana and
Illinois), then it is very unlikely that a university
professor from the state of Rhode Island would
have become Bank president. Nor is it likely that I
would have been appointed through a Washington
political process, given that I had served in a
Republican administration but that a Democratic
administration controlled the White House in 1998
when I was named St. Louis Fed president.
What this private-sector process does is to
reinforce the nonpolitical nature of the Federal
Reserve System. The process also involves the
Reserve Bank directors in an important way. The
Federal Reserve pays the Bank directors very little;
what they get out of service as director is an intense
education in monetary policy. Over their years of
service, and for years thereafter, the directors spread
knowledge of monetary policy processes and chal-
lenges throughout their communities. I cannot
imagine a more effective way of building support
for sound monetary policy than having community
leaders from many different professions serve as
directors. Consider, for example, the breadth of
experience on the current St. Louis board; the board
includes CEOs of commercial banks, the managing
partner of a major law firm, CEOs of both large and
small businesses, a university professor who also
manages a family farm, an expert in the venture
capital industry, and the CEO of a nonprofit com-
munity organization. Some Reserve Banks include
trade union leaders; although that is not the case
currently for the St. Louis Fed, one of the Bank’s
branch boards does include a trade union leader.
Taking the twelve Federal Reserve Banks together,
directors are drawn from every sector of the econ-
omy and every geographic region.
Equally important to the Federal Reserve is the
flow of information from Reserve Bank directors to
Bank presidents, who in turn use this information
in formulating monetary policy decisions. Valuable
information also comes from numerous advisory
committees that meet from time to time at the
Board of Governors and the Reserve Banks, and from
contacts between Federal Reserve officials and their
audiences as they travel to speak at various events
and meet with business and community leaders.
The Federal Reserve has maintained a continuous
association with what are known in the United
States as “grass roots” contacts throughout the
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Reserve System did not prevent the monetary policy
mistakes that contributed to the Great Depression
and the Great Inflation, I believe that the current
process contributes greatly to the prospects for con-
tinued sound monetary policy in the years ahead.
TRANSPARENCY
In recent years, central banks have become more
open in many different ways. In the past, central
bankers often discussed monetary policy in obscure
ways and seemed to relish the mystique of central
banking. As an academic, I never thought that exten-
sive secrecy served central banks well, and still don’t. 
Particularly given central bank independence,
openness is essential to political accountability.
Whether by law or confirmed practice, good central
bank design calls for central banks to make timely
reports about policy actions, including the reasons
for these changes. 
I’ve discussed transparency on several occasions
at considerable length; here I want to make two main
points. First, prompt disclosure of policy decisions
and the rationale for those decisions is essential.
However, disclosure of policy debates leading up to
decisions must be handled extremely carefully.
Excessive disclosure will damage the openness of
the internal debate and thereby increase the likeli-
hood of policy mistakes. Moreover, with many differ-
ent views expressed around the policy table, and
views expressed provisionally and for the sake of
argument and thoroughness, full disclosure of inter-
nal debate without a substantial lag is more likely
to confuse markets than enlighten them. I believe
that the Federal Reserve practice of disclosing the
transcript of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
meetings with a five-year lag works well. A lag of
that length maintains ultimate accountability and
provides a valuable record for scholars while pre-
venting damage to the policy process.
My second main point is that prompt disclosure
of policy decisions and their rationale is necessary
for markets to function efficiently. Monetary policy
works through markets; if markets expect one policy
direction when the central bank intends another,
both the markets and the central bank are likely to
be surprised at some point and disappointed by
the results.
CONCLUSION
There is no uniquely optimal way to write a
central bank law and to institutionalize central bank
practices. Different countries have different histories
and different preferences. Let me pull together the
threads of my argument: A good design for the
central bank will contain three main elements.
First, the government should assign clear and
obtainable objectives to the central bank. I favor a
legislated inflation target, but more important than
legislation is an understanding in the society that
low and stable inflation is the central bank’s respon-
sibility and that the bank should be judged on how
well it achieves that objective. A government may
assign to the central bank a policy goal of contribut-
ing to stability in income and employment, pro-
vided there is a clear understanding that there can
be no central bank target for the level of employment
or the rate of growth of GDP. 
Second, the central bank should operate inde-
pendently within the government; the governor
should have a reasonably long term of office and
should not be subject to removal by the president,
except for cause through an impeachment process.
The president should not be able to overturn indi-
vidual monetary policy decisions and ideally should
confine comment on those decisions to confidential
communications with the central bank. 
Third, the central bank should be transparent
in the way it makes decisions and implements policy.
Political accountability requires transparency; so
also does the efficient operation of the markets
through which monetary policy affects the economy.
These three principles broadly characterize all
major central banks today. We should not, however,
take that fact as reason to assume that the issue is
settled. We are bound to face stresses in the future
when many will question these principles. Stating
them now, defending them and explaining them, is
our best hope for improving public understanding
and maintaining the progress of recent years that
is so evident to all central banks and students of
central banking.
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